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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
CAROLYN M. EDWARDS*
INTRODUCTION
Today, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' is the
principal statute governing transactions in goods2 in every state
other than Louisiana. The Article is conspicuously silent, how-
ever, on some of the issues that arise in sales transactions.
Section 1-1031 provides that under these circumstances courts
may supplement the Code with principles of common law and
equity unless such principles are displaced by particular Code
provisions.
Section 2-2011 is Article 2's Statute of Frauds provision. The
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A. Wells Col-
lege, 1964; J.D. University of Toledo, 1970.
1. All references in this article are to the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
2. Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-102. "Goods" are defined
in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) as:
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
"Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).
The term "transaction" is not defined, but it is now clear that the term has broader
application than to the traditional true sale. See Murray, Under the Spreading Anal-
ogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971).
3. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its.provisions." For a discussion of § 1-103, see Summers, General Equita-
ble Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. Ray.
906 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
4. U.C.C. § 2-201 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing.
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section applies to contracts for the sale of goods5 for the price
of $500 or more. This article examines the question of whether
the doctrine of estoppel' may be applied pursuant to section 1-
103 to render enforceable an oral agreement which though fall-
ing within section 2-201 fails to satisfy its requirements. This
question has frequently arisen under the Code and there is a
conflict of authority.' Section 2-201 must therefore be analyzed
in light of this disagreement to determine whether the doctrine
of estoppel has been displaced.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
During the fourteenth century, when the laws of contracts
and evidence were in their infancy,8 oral agreements were com-
monly enforced and, as a result, assertions of fraudulent and
perjured contracts were common. The English Parliament re-
sponded in 1677 by enacting the Statute of Frauds The Stat-
ute's stated purpose was "the prevention of many fraudulent
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirma-
tion of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its con-
tents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commit-
ments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and ac-
cepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).
The 1962 and 1972 versions of § 2-201 are identical.
5. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) defines "contract for sale" to include "both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time."
6. The doctrine of estoppel has taken a variety of forms. See text accompanying
notes 52-66 & 78-81 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.
8. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
Statute of Frauds and the reasons certain types of contracts were included within its
provisions, see 6 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 379-97 (1924). See also
Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L.
Rav. 440 (1931).
9. 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677).
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practices which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by per-
jury and subornation of perjury."10 The Statute contained
twenty-five provisions with sections 4" and 17 dealing with
contracts. Section 17 applied to contracts for the sale of goods
and provided that,
[No] contract for the sale of any goods, wares, and mer-
chandizes for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards,
shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part
of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give
something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part payment,
or that some note or memorandum in writing of the said
bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by
such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.'2
The purpose of each alternative method of compliance was
to provide reliable evidence of the existence of a contract be-
tween the parties and thus to prevent the enforcement of an
unfounded fraudulent claim. 3 Satisfaction of any one of the
methods rendered an oral contract for the sale of goods which
fell within the Statute enforceable."
Statutes modeled after the English Statute of Frauds, in-
cluding section 17, were subsequently enacted, with some mod-
10. Id.
11. Id. Section 4 provided:
And be it .further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after
the said four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought [(1)]
whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise, to
answer damages out of his own estate; (2) or whereby to charge the defendant
upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriages of
another person; (3) or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon
consideration of marriage; (4) or upon any contract [flor sale of lands, tene-
ments, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon any
agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the
making thereof; (6) unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person thereunto by him
lawfully authorized.
12. Id. § 17.
13. Other functions in addition to the evidentiary function may be served by the
Statute of Frauds. Professor Fuller discusses two: cautionary and channeling. See
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941). See also Rabel, The
Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L.Q. Ray. 174 (1947); Vold, The
Application of the Statute of Frauds Under the Uniform Sales Act, 15 MINN. L. Rav.
391, 393-95 (1931).
14. Section 17 provided that no contract which failed to comply with the Statute
"shall be allowed to be good." The intended effect of this language was to make the
agreement unenforceable. 3 S. WILLISTON, A TRAFTISE ON THE LAw OF CONTACTS § 525
(3d ed. 1960).
1978]
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ifications, throughout most of the United States. In 1906 sec-
tion 17 was replaced by section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act.'5
Like its predecessor, section 4 applied to any contract for the
sale of goods wherein the value of the goods or choses in action
was $500 or more. Alternative methods for satisfying the sec-
tion were provided. For instance, a note or memorandum in
writing signed by the party to be charged or his agent could be
employed to meet the Statute's requirements. Alternatively,
acceptance and receipt of part of the goods or choses in action
were sufficient, as was the giving of something in earnest to
bind the contract or in part payment. A contract which fell
within the scope of the Statute but failed to satisfy its require-
ment was unenforceable."
Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act was later replaced by
section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code." By its terms
section 2-201 applies to contracts for the sale of goods of $500
or more.'" The section is similar to prior law in that its purpose
is to prevent the fraudulent enforcement of contracts to which
the parties may not have assented. 9 The section also retains
15. U.S.A. § 4 provided:
(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value
of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the
buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold
or sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the
contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of
the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that
behalf.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract or sale,
notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future
time or may not at the time of such contract or sale be actually made, procured,
or provided, or fit or ready for delivery or some act may be requisite for the
making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery; but if the
goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the
provisions of this section shall not apply.
(3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when
the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses by words or
conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods.
For a textual treatment of the Uniform Sales Act § 4, see L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF SALES §§ 13-22 (1959).
16. U.S.A. § 4(1).
17. See note 4 supra. Section 2-201 was not received favorably. See, e.g., Corbin,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 830-
31 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Corbin]; Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. Rsv. 561, 573-76 (1950).
18. U.C.C. § 2-201, unlike the U.S.A. § 4, does not apply to "choses in action."
Sales of choses in action are now covered by U.C.C. §§ 8-319, 1-206.
19. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1.
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the traditional view that if this purpose is to be achieved the
parties must be required to produce reliable evidence of the
oral contract in order to render it enforceable.2 0 The section
does not, however, merely re-enact the principles of section 4
of the Uniform Sales Act. It makes significant changes in the
substance of these principles" and in addition, introduces prin-
ciples which are entirely new.
Subsection 2-201(1) retains the requirement of a writing as
the primary method for satisfying the Statute. The writing2
must indicate that a contract for sale2 has been made in addi-
tion to being signed24 by the party against whom enforcement
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. This subsection
makes a significant change in prior law by modifying the rule
established by some courts that all material terms of the con-
tract be contained in the writing.2 The rule had often resulted
in injustice rather than in preventing fraud.26 The subsection
20. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 4 provides in part that, "Failure to satisfy the re-
quirements of this section does not render the contract void for all purposes, but merely
prevents it from being judicially enforced. .. ."
21. For a detailed discussion of the differences between U.S.A. § 4 and U.C.C. §
2-201, see 58 DICK. L. REy. 373 (1954). See also 3 BENDER's U.C.C. SEav. §§ 2.01-.04,
at 2-1 to 2-108 (1978). A number of authorities have discussed the provisions of U.C.C.
§ 2-201 in detail. See, e.g., 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. §§ 2.01-.05, at 2-1 to 2-110 (1978);
J. WHTr & R. SumMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 2-2 to 2-8, at 44-65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHrrE & SUMMERs].
22. The writing may take any form. See, e.g., Cohn v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286,
287 A.2d 222 (1972) (check in part payment held to satisfy the writing requirement).
The writing necessary to satisfy the Statute may be contained in more than one
document. See, e.g., Alaska Independent Fishermen's Marketing Ass'n v. New Eng-
land Fish Co., 15 Wash. App. 154, 548 P.2d 348 (1976).
23. The comments to U.C.C. § 2-201 do not indicate what must be contained in
the writing to indicate that a contract for sale has been made. Compare Fortune
Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Mid-South Plastic Fabric Co., 310 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 1975) ("This
is to confirm the agreement entered into this date" evidenced contract for sale), with
Alice v. Robett Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affl'd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th
Cir. 1971) ("Confirming our telephone conversation, we are pleased to offer" did not
evidence contract for sale).
24. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) provides that, " 'Signed' includes any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." See Comment,
Sufficiency of the Writing and Necessity for a Signature in the Statute of Frauds of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 4 U.S.F. L. REV. 177 (1969).
25. Although U.S.A. § 4 did not require that all material terms be included in the
writing, this requirement was established by some courts. See, e.g., R.H. Lindsay Co.
v. Greager, 204 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953). Some courts
required that all terms agreed upon appear in the writing. See, e.g., Berman Stores
Co. v. Hirsh, 240 N.Y. 209, 148 N.E. 212 (1925).
26. Professor Corbin observes that the requirement
thereby made it possible for a dishonest contractor to admit the making of the
1978]
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provides that the writing is "not insufficient because it omits
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon. '2 7 The contract, how-
ever, is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in
the writing.2
Another change in prior law was made in subsection 2-
201(2). This subsection provides that as between merchants,2
a confirmation of a contract which is sufficient against the
sendee satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) if the recip-
ient has reason to know the contents of the memorandum and
written notice of objection is not made within ten days after
receipt." This subsection thus creates an exception to the re-
quirement that the writing must be signed by the party against
contract and yet to repudiate it; indeed, even to go so far as to make proof
themselves of the terms of the contract that they had made in order to repudiate
the very memorandum that they had signed.
Corbin, supra note 17, at 830-31.
27. U.C.C. § 2-201(1). U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1, makes it clear that this change
is consistent with the purpose of the Statute to prevent enforcement of unfounded
claims, since missing terms, including price, may normally be supplied without danger
of fraud.
28. There has been some dispute whether the writing must state a quantity term.
Professors Summers and White have suggested that, "An alternative interpretation of
the language is that only if the writing states a quantitative.term is that term determi-
native." WHTE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, at § 2-4, at 51 n.44. However, U.C.C. § 2-
201, Comment 1 states: "The only term which must appear is the quantity term which
need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated." Most
courts support the view that the quantity term must appear. See, e.g., Riegel Fiber
Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975); Ace Concrete Prods. Co. v.
Charles J. Rogers Const. Co., 69 Mich. App. 610, 245 N.W.2d 353 (1976).
29. The term "merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) to mean:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attrib-
uted by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Unfortunately, in some instances, the term has been a troublesome one to apply. See
Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Is the Farmer a "Merchant"?, 28 BAYLOR L. REv.
715 (1976).
30. To be sufficient against the sender, the confirmation must be signed by the
sender and state a quantity. The contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity of
goods stated. See note 28 supra.
31. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 3, provides that the effect of the subsection is to bar
a merchant who fails to respond to a confirmation from relying on the Statute as a
defense. Thus, the confirmation serves the same function as a writing signed by the
party to be charged. It provides reliable evidence that an agreement exists. The confir-
mation letter does not eliminate the burden which the party alleging the contract has
to prove that an agreement was in fact made orally prior to the confirmation. For cases
interpreting the requirements of this subsection, including those which have miscon-
strued its effect, see 3 BENDER's U.C.C. SEnv. § 2.04[2], at 2-48 (1978).
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whom enforcement is sought. Its purpose is to give effect to the
custom of merchants of sending confirming memoranda of
prior oral agreements. Under prior law, the normal expecta-
tions of the parties were likely to be frustrated and this created
opportunities for abuse in transactions between merchants.2
Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act33 provided that a memoran-
dum was binding only against the party who had signed it.
Thus a confirming letter was binding against the sender, but
not against the recipient. The recipient of the memorandum
could sit back and play the market before deciding whether to
accept the agreed upon consideration while binding the sender
to render performance.
Subsection 2-201(3) sets forth three alternative methods of
satisfying the Statute absent a writing. Subsection 2-201(3)(a)
provides that a contract for goods to be specially manufactured
is enforceable against the buyer if the goods are not suitable for
sale to others in the ordinary course of seller's business, and the
seller, before receiving notice of repudiation, has made either
a substantial beginning on their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement. The subsection makes two principal
changes in prior law. Under section 4 of the Uniform Sales
Act, 4 the provisions of the Statute of Frauds did not apply if
the goods were manufactured by the seller and were not suita-
ble for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's busi-
ness. The Code rejects the requirement that the goods must be
manufactured by the seller and provides that the goods may be
specially manufactured by the seller or by a third party. Under
the Sales Act, once it was established that a contract was for
specially manufactured goods, the contract was enforceable
even though manufacturing had not started. -The Code modi-
fied this principle by providing that the oral contract is not
enforceable unless the seller has acted in reliance on the oral
contract before notice of repudiation is received. Such reliance
strengthens the evidence of a contract. It is more difficult
32. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Minister, 86 Nev. 576, 471 P.2d 661 (1970) (wherein the
court characterized the practice under prior law of sending a confirming memorandum
as "dangerous").
33. See note 15 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. The reliance may also be viewed as establishing the quantity term beyond
which the contract is not enforceable. In other words, the subsection may be inter-
preted to limit enforcement of the contract to those goods which the seller has substan-
tially begun or made commitments to procure. See R. NORDsTRoM, HANDBOOK OF THE
1978]
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therefore under the Code for a seller to successfully assert a
contract for specially manufactured goods against a buyer who
has not in fact assented to the contract.
The second alternative method of satisfying the Statute
absent a writing is found in subsection 2-201(3)(b), which is
based on prior case law and has no counterpart in the Uniform
Sales Act. The subsection provides that a contract is enforcea-
ble if a party admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise,
in court, the existence of a contract for sale. The contract,
however, is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods ad-
mitted .3 This subsection is based upon the notion that once a
party has admitted the existence of a contract in court, the
possibility of binding an innocent party to a contrived contract
disappears. The subsection also eliminates the injustice and
conceptual inconsistency of allowing a party to admit the con-
tract in court and still treat the Statute as a defense.3
Subsection 2-201(3)(c) provides the final alternative of sat-
isfying the Statute without evidence of a writing. Subsection
2-201(3)(c) makes a writing unnecessary if there has been ei-
ther part payment of the purchase price or acceptance 39 and
LAW OF SALES § 27 (1970). Professors Summers and White do not interpret the subsec-
tion as containing a quantity limitation. WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, at § 2-5,
at 54-59. The cases appear to support the latter interpretation. See, e.g., LTV Aero-
space Corp. v. Bateman, 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Perlmutter Printing
Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
36. Note, Contracts: Statute of Frauds: Deposition Signed on Compulsion of a
Court Order as Constituting a Memorandum: Smith v. Muss, 117 N. YS.2d 501 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1952), 38 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1953). See, e.g., Trossbach v. Trossbach,
185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945); Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946).
See also 2 A. CoRBm, CoNRAcTs § 519, at 757-61 (1950).
37. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 7, states that, "[Tihe contract is not thus conclu-
sively established. The admission so made by a party is itself evidential against him
of the truth of the facts so admitted and of nothing more; as against the other party,
it is not evidential at all." For a discussion of whether involuntary admissions satisfy
§ 2-201, see Yonge, The Unheralded Demise of the Statute of Frauds Welsher in Oral
Contracts for the Sale of Goods and Investment Securities: Oral Sales Contracts are
Enforceable by Involuntary Admissions in Court Under U.C.C. Sections 2-201(3)(b)
and 8-319(d), 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1 (1976).
38. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 7.
39. U.C.C. § 2-606 provides:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the
seller that the joods are conforming or that he will take or retain them
in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602),
but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or
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receipt" of the goods. These methods of satisfying the Statute
are derived, with some modifications," from prior law. How-
ever, the Code narrows significantly the former rule. Under
prior law, if a buyer made a part payment for the goods, or the
buyer accepted and received a part thereof, the entire contract
was rendered enforceable. This rule did not provide protection
against the fraudulent assertion that a contract existed for a
quantity greater than that actually agreed to by the parties. 12
Subsection 2-201(3)(c) remedies the prior rule's inadequacies
by expressly limiting enforcement of the contract to goods for
which payment has been made or which have been received
and accepted. 3
The changes in and additions to prior law which section 2-
201 makes reflect the drafters' judgment that the old law did
not adequately prevent the many fraudulent practices which
had grown around the enforcement of oral contracts. In fact the
old law in certain instances had failed to provide reliable evi-
dence of the existence of an oral contract" and had therefore
been turned into an instrument for perpetrating frauds. As
mentioned earlier, however, the section remains fundamentally
faithful to prior law: Its primary objective is to avoid enforce-
ment of a contract to which the parties have not assented, an
objective which the drafters determined could be achieved only
if reliable evidence as set forth in the Statute was required
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act
is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of the entire
unit.
40. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) defines "receipt" of goods as "taking physical possession
of them."
41. "Acceptance" under U.S.A. § 4(3) was defined somewhat differently than
"acceptance" under U.C.C. § 2-606. See note 15 supra for the definition of
"acceptance" under U.S.A. § 4(3). The term "receipt" under the Code retains the same
definition as under the U.S.A. See 3 S. WILISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CoNRACrs § 551 (1960).
42. Professor Corbin observes: "No doubt this limitation was made because it has
always been possible for a handy liar to testify orally that he paid a dollar on account
or delivered one of the shoe strings, thus making it easy to defeat the real purpose of
the Statute." Corbin, supra note 17, at 831.
43. Where goods are apportionable, part payment takes a case out of the Statute
only as to the portion for which payment is made. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 2. How-
ever, part payment on the sale of an indivisible unit has been held to render the
contract enforceable for that unit. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Smigel, 18 Cal. App. 3d 800,
96 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971); Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d
58 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
44. See also Corbin, supra note 17.
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before an oral contract would be held enforceable by way of
action or defense.
The question thus arises: are there any circumstances under
which an oral contract will be held enforceable though none of
the provisions of section 2-201 has been satisfied? To answer
this question, it is necessary to examine briefly the develop-
ment of the doctrine of estoppel and the variety of forms which
the doctrine has taken.
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
Long before the Code was ad6pted, courts of equity enforced
oral contracts which fell within the scope of the Statute of
Frauds yet failed to satisfy the Statute's requirements if the
party alleging the contract could establish all the elements of
legal fraud. Legal fraud required that the promisor have an
intent to deceive." Enforcement of an oral contract when the
elements of legal fraud were present was not regarded as an
abrogation of the Statute since "The ground upon which courts
of equity interfere[d], in such cases, . . . [was] that of fraud.
The jurisdiction . . .[was] founded, not upon the agreement,
but upon the fraud." '"6
Courts of equity also recognized that to permit reliance
upon the Statute as a defense to defeat enforcement of an
otherwise valid oral contract would perpetrate, in many cases,
a moral fraud.47 Moral fraud as distinguished from legal fraud
could be perpetrated without an intent to deceive.48 It consisted
of using the Statute as a defense,
after the other party has been induced to make expenditures,
or a change of situation in regard to the subject matter of the
45. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230, 133 N.E. 70 (1921); Watson
v. Erb, 33 Ohio St. 35 (1877).
46. Crabill v. Marsh, 38 Ohio St. 331, 338 (1882).
47. For detailed discussions of the development of the doctrine of estoppel, see
McNeill, Agreements to Reduce to Writing Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds,
15 VA. L. Rav. 553 (1929); Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute
of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. Rav. 440 (1931). Courts have generally viewed the Statute with
some disfavor since strict enforcement can cause hardship. As a result, they have
developed a number of devices to take the agreement outside the Statute. The doctrine
of part performance as applied to permit specific performance of an oral contract which
falls under the land sebtion of the Statute is probably the best known. See generally 2
A. Com, CoNmACTs §§ 420-43, at 450-533 (1950).
48. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909); Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank
& Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A.2d 146 (1938); Ozier v. Haines, 411111. 160, 103 N.E.2d
485 (1952). See also 3 J. PoMRoy, A TRFATISE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 190-
98 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as PoMERoY].
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agreement, or upon the supposition that it was to be carried
into execution, and the assumption of rights thereby to be
acquired; so that the refusal to complete the execution of
the agreement is not merely a denial of rights which it was
intended to confer, but the infliction of an unjust and un-
conscientious injury and loss."
Such fraud was possible because the Statute declared unen-
forceable any oral contract which failed to comply with its
requirements even though the contract had been agreed upon
and had induced detrimental reliance by the promisee. To pre-
vent the infliction of unjust and unconscionable injury, courts
of equity applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar reli-
ance upon the Statute as a defense.4 The doctrine was invoked
on the grounds that courts of equity should grant relief against
the unconscionable operation of the Statute. Moreover, it was
frequently said that the Statute of Frauds, having been en-
acted to prevent fraud, should not be permitted to wreak harsh
and fraudulent results."
Traditionally, estoppel required a misrepresentation of fact,
as where the promisor stated that a writing satisfying the re-
quirements of the Statute had been executed." In time, some
courts extended the doctrine of equitable estoppel to include
promises that a writing satisfying the Statute would be exe-
49. Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 35-36 (1869).
50. Professor Pomeroy listed six elements to establish estoppel:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a repre-
sentation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to
the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances
must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth
concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit
of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at the time when
it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or
at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or
under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so
acted upon. There are several familiar species in which it is simply impossible
to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the party estopped that his
conduct will be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims the benefit of the
estoppel. 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus
relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a
manner as to change his position for the worse; in other words, he must so act
that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter
what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his
conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.
Posmoy, supra note 48, at 191-92 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
52. PompRoy, supra note 48.
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cuted sometime in the future.53 The First Restatement of
Contracts supported the application of estoppel under such
circumstances. 4 It indicated, however, in an apparent attempt
to distinguish misrepresentations of fact from promises relating
to future intentions, that promissory estoppel5 5 should apply to
defeat reliance on the Statute rather than equitable estoppel. 6
In 1950 the California Supreme Court in Monarco v. Lo
Greco,51 a case which involved an action to enforce an oral
contract for the conveyance of land, applied principles of estop-
pel even though the promisor had not misrepresented a fact or
promised that a writing satisfying the Statute would later be
executed. In rejecting these traditional elements, the court ob-
served that, "[I]t is not the representation that the contract
will be put in writing or that the statute will not be invoked,
but the promise that the contract will be performed that a
party relies upon when he changes his position because of it."'
In other words, the representation required to invoke the doc-
trine of estoppel and to bar reliance upon the Statute as a
defense was a promissory statement that the contract would be
performed. The court did retain, however, the traditional re-
quirement that there be either unconscionable injury to the
53. See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). For a discussion
of this extension and additional cases, see McNeill, Agreements to Reduce to Writing
Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds, 15 VA. L. Rav. 553 (1929).
54. REsTATamENT OF CON'aASrS § 178, Comment f (1932) provided:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may pre-
clude objection on that ground in the same way that objection to the non-
existence of other facts essential for the establishment of a right or a defence
may be precluded. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if
substantial action is taken in reliance on the representation, precludes proof by
the party who made the representation that it was false; and a promise to make
a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective promissory
estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud.
55. Id. Comment f did not define "promissory estoppel." Id. Section 90 was gener-
ally regarded as establishing the elements of promissory estoppel even though neither
§ 90 nor its accompanying comments so stated. See note 60 infra.
56. The doctrine of estoppel by representation is usually applicable only to repre-
sentations as to facts either past or present and not to promises concerning the future.
However, some courts recognized an exception where the statement related to an
abandonment of an existing right and was made to influence another whose action was
in fact influenced by it. See, e.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544
(1878). Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
57. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). For a detailed discussion of this case, see
Comment, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALF. L.
Rav. 590 (1965).
58. 35 Cal.2d at -, 220 P.2d at 741 (emphasis added).
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promisee who had relied on the oral contract or unjust enrich-
ment to the promisor.
The rule the court formulated was subsequently applied by
other courts to a variety of fact situations, including sales gov-
erned by the Uniform Sales Act. 9 At about the same time,
several courts construed section 900 of the First Restatement
of Contracts as displacing the Statute's requirements even
though a promise to reduce the agreement to writing was lack-
ing.8 ' This use of section 90 was surprising since neither section
90 nor its accompanying comments intimated that the provi-
sions of the section could be applied to defeat reliance on the
Statute. Indeed, section 178, comment (f) of the First
Restatement suggested that promissory estoppel was available
in Statute of Frauds cases only where a promise to reduce the
agreement to writing had been made.62 Further, the provisions
of section 90 had traditionally been used solely as means to
create a substitute for consideration."3 In other words if the
elements of the section were satisfied, a promise for which a
consideration had never been requested or received was never-
theless enforceable.
As a practical matter, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
as defined in section 90 and as applied to prevent inequitable
use of the Statute of Frauds was indistinguishable from the
doctrine of estoppel established in Monarco.64 Neither required
59. See, e.g., Union Packing Co. v. Cariboo Land & Cattle Co., 191 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952), reh. denied, 342 U.S. 934 (1952); Mosekian
v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118, 40 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1964); Goldstein v.
McNeil, 122 Cal. App. 2d 608, 265 P.2d 113 (1954). It has been suggested that this
latter case constitutes a questionable extension of the estoppel doctrine. Comment,
Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 590, 605
(1965).
60. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1932) provides: "A promise which the promi-
sor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
61. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); Aubrey v.
Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160,
103 N.E.2d 485 (1952). Although Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1954), is frequently cited for its use of § 90, the case is distinguishable in that there
was an alleged promise to execute a writing. Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of
Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 FORDHAm L. Rsv. 114 (1975).
62. See note 54 supra.
63. For discussions of the development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: 1, 50 MicH. L. Rnv. 639 (1952);
Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343
(1969).
64. The court in Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950), observed
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a misrepresentation of fact nor a promise that the agreement
would later be reduced to writing. Each focused on the extent
of the reliance which the oral contract had induced and the
seriousness of the injury caused thereby. Each rendered the
oral contract enforceable by recognizing that reliance may fur-
nish a compelling substantive basis for relief even though the
formal requirements of the Statute were not satisfied.
As each form of estoppel was adopted, criticism mounted
that its continued application constituted an abrogation of the
Statute . 5 Although the courts seldom offered an explanation of
why these forms had such an effect, the courts were unques-
tionably concerned that their application resulted in the en-
forcement of an oral contract which the Statute declared to be
unenforceable. It cannot be gainsaid; the Statute sets forth
specific methods of compliance. Estoppel, in any form, has the
effect of creating a method which is not recognized by the
legislature. Indeed, the usual rule of statutory construction
would suggest that since specific methods for satisfying the
Statute are expressly provided for, other methods are therefore
intended to be excluded. Further, the underlying purpose of
each of the methods is to provide reliable evidence of the exist-
ence of an agreement. In the absence of such evidence, the
possibility for the fraudulent assertion of a contract obviously
increases. The doctrine of estoppel therefore deviates from the
stated purpose of the act by increasing the number of instances
in which a contract will be enforced without the type of evi-
dence envisioned by the drafters. Thus, whether the usual rules
of statutory construction are applied or the purposes of the
Statute are considered, it seems clear that application of estop-
that it is the promise to perform that induces reliance. This promise may be implied
in any case where a party to an oral contract promises, for example, to buy or sell
goods. In other words, the promise to buy or sell implies a promise to perform. It would
appear therefore that § 90 and the rule of Monarco are indistinguishable in this respect
also. See note 60 supra.
65. For a discussion of the cases where the courts refused to apply estoppel where
there had been a promise to put the contract in writing, see McNeill, Agreements to
Reduce to Writing Contracts within the Statute of Frauds, 15 VA. L. REv. 553 (1929).
For a discussion of cases rejecting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 90 (1932), see Hender-
son, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 380-83
(1969). In Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952), the court rejected the
doctrine of estoppel established in Monarco by saying: "It is true that harsh results,
or moral fraud . . . may occur where one has changed his position in reliance on the
oral promise of another, but it is a result which is invited and risked when the agree-
ment is not reduced to writing in the manner prescribed by law." Id. at 164-65, 103
N.E.2d at 488.
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pel, whether in its traditional or more modem forms, is con-
trary to the expressed legislative policy."
SECTION 2-201 AND THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
It was against this background that section 2-201 was
adopted. Does section 2-201 displace all forms of estoppel? An
examination of this question is complicated by several factors.
First, section 1-103, which provides that the Code is supple-
mented by the principles of law and equity unless displaced by
particular provisions of the act, has no precedent in prior law.
Thus the question of whether or not estoppel is displaced by
section 2-201 is an entirely new one. Section 1-103 does not
establish rules for determining when displacement occurs, 7 nor
does section 2-201 or its accompanying comments contain an
express statement indicating the intent of the drafters. Fur-
ther, section 2-201 makes changes in and additions to prior law.
Thus, the question of displacement must be examined in light
of these new circumstances. "Moreover, although not all courts
have considered the question of whether to supplement the
Statute, the majority of those that have suggest that estoppel
in one form or another may be applied." Unfortunately, these
courts have not offered a thorough examination or analysis of
the question of displacement. Therefore, it is necessary to de-
termine, in so far as it is possible, on what basis the decision
66. See, e.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla.
1966). The Tanenbaum court observed: "Thirty-three years have passed since the
Restatement... was adopted and there have been about 15 intervening sessions of
the legislature at which the contents of Sec. 90 of the Restatement could have been
incorporated into the act yet we know of no such effort or accomplishment." Id. at 779.
67. Professor Summers suggests that courts adopt the following procedure for de-
termining whether a section may be supplemented by principles of equity:
(1) Which specific Code section (or sections), if any, applies or appears to
apply?
(2) What would be the effect of its application? In particular, would this effect
be inequitable as between the parties?
(3) If the effect appears inequitable as between the parties, does section 1-103
authorize resort to general equitable principles here? Does the relevant Code
section (or sections) displace all such principles?
(4) If the specific Code section (or sections) does not displace general equitable
principles, which general equitable principle comes into play?
(5) How is the applicable general equitable principle to be formulated? Does
non-Code law of the jurisdiction reject it? Should this rejection be rejected?
(6) If the non-Code law of the jurisdiction does not repudiate the principle,
how is it to be applied to avoid an inequitable result as between the parties?
Summers, supra note 3, at 945-46.
68. See cases cited note 74 infra.
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that the section does not displace estoppel is made.
As already discussed, section 2-201 is fundamentally similar
to prior law. 9 In view of this similarity, it might be argued that
application of estoppel, in any form, to supplement section 2-
201 is subject to the same criticisms leveled against estoppel
under the prior law. Since the effect of estoppel under prior law
was to abrogate the purpose of the Statute, so too could estop-
pel be criticized under Article 2. If the drafters had intended
to abrogate the Statute of Frauds, there was a far more direct
route available. They could have simply refused to adopt the
Statute as part of Article 2. The Statute of Frauds had been
the subject of extensive comment and debate prior to the adop-
tion of the Code. Though a number of commentators had urged
the repeal" of the Statute, the drafters ultimately chose to
retain it. This suggests that the Statute was perceived as serv-
ing a valid purpose. It also suggests that the principles to be
included in the section, such as those imposing quantity limits,
were carefully drawn to achieve the statutory purpose and to
limit the use of the Statute as a defense to cases where there
was a definite possibility of fraud. Thus, reliance on an oral
contract which does not meet the requirements of any one or
more of the section's provisions may create hardship but it does
not satisfy the evidentiary function of the Statute. In other
words, whether the intent of the drafters or the purpose of each
subsection is considered, the inference arises that to enforce an
oral contract to avoid unconscionability or injustice where the
contract does not satisfy the Statute is contrary to the legisla-
tive policy expressed in the section. The conclusion may be
drawn that estoppel should therefore be displaced. This con-
clusion has merit for it promotes a basic objective of the Code
to provide consistent and predictable principles for governing
transactions involving the sales of goods. 7'
There are, however, several countervailing arguments
which support the view that the doctrine of estoppel is not
69. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
70. See generally Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 273
(1916); Willis, The Statute of Frauds: A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427 (1928).
For a defense of the Statute, see Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931). Professor Corbin observes: "The total repeal of
the statute would involve such a wrench to the mental habits of bench and bar that it
is very unlikely to occur." 2 A. CoRam, CONTRAaTS § 275, at 14 (1950) (footnote omit-
ted).
71. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102 & 2-103(4).
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displaced. The fact that section 2-201 is relatively similar to
prior law also means that the arguments which support the use
of estoppel also remain equally viable. Section 2-201 elimi-
nated a number of abuses that occurred under prior law.72 How-
ever, in declaring that any oral contract which does not satisfy
its terms is unenforceable, the section may cause unconsciona-
ble injury or injustice. That is, the section may be used to
defeat enforcement of a contract'which the parties have in fact
agreed upon, and on which one party has relied to his detri-
ment. It may be argued that under these circumstances the
doctrine of estoppel should be applied. Further, in view of the
controversy which developed prior to the adoption of the Code,
over use of estoppel, and the fact that section 2-201 may in
certain circumstances cause injury or injustice, it is significant
that neither the section nor its accompanying comments ad-
dress the question of whether estoppel may supplement the
provisions of the section. This silence may be interpreted to
mean that the drafters did not intend to displace the doctrine
and that the issue of whether the section should be supple-
mented in any particular fact situation should be resolved by
the courts in accordance with the principles of section 1-103. 73
Moreover, section 1-103 expressly provides that estoppel may
supplement the Code unless displaced by particular Code pro-
visions. In view of the reference to estoppel in section 1-103, the
drafters may have thought it unnecessary to address in either
section 2-201 or its accompanying comments the question of
the doctrine's applicability in Statute of Frauds cases. It might
be argued, therefore, that application of estoppel does not abro-
gate section 2-201 since section 1-103 expressly authorizes its
use. In other words, estoppel is not contrary to the legislative
policy expressed in section 2-201 and thus should not be dis-
placed.
The majority of courts which have considered the question
of whether section 2-201 displaces the common law doctrine of
estoppel support the interpretation that estoppel may supple-
ment the section's provisions. To these courts the controversy
centers not on the question of displacement, but on the form
of estoppel to be applied.7'
72. See text accompanying notes 25-43 supra.
73. See Summers, supra note 3.
74. See, e.g., Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976);
Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232 N.W.2d 921
(1975); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975);
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Although section 1-103 refers to the doctrine of estoppel, it
does not indicate what form the doctrine should take. As a
result, the courts have incorporated into the Code, via section
1-103, all the forms which had developed under past law. Some
courts have required that a misrepresentation or concealment
of a material fact be established in order for an estoppel to
attach.7 5 At least one court has suggested that estoppel will bar
reliance on the Statute where a promise to reduce the agree-
ment to writing has been made.76 Other courts have suggested
that promissory estoppel should be available in appropriate
circumstances .77
One recent development should be noted. Section 217A78 of
Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976); Jamestown
Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976); Farmers Coop. Elevator
Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 238 N.W.2d
290 (S.D. 1976).
75. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232
N.W.2d 921 (1975) (evidence of a misrepresentation lacking); Farmers Coop. Elevator
Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976) (evidence of a misrepresentation lacking);
Darrow v. Spencer, 581 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1978) (evidence of a misrepresentation lack-
ing). In Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974), the court appeared to suggest
that the Statute should not be supplemented by any form of estoppel. The term
"estoppel" has been applied by courts to encompass a variety of doctrines. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that the terms "promissory estoppel," "equitable estop-
pel" and "estoppel" are used interchangeably. For example, the court in Jamestown
Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976) suggested that promis-
sory estoppel requires conduct amounting to a false representation or concealment of
material facts. However, the court apparently found this element satisfied since the
promisor had conveyed to the promisee "the implication . . . that the sale was com-
plete." Id. at 741. See also Darrow v. Spencer, 581 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1978). Caution
must therefore be used in interpreting the cases.
76. H. Molsen & Co. v. Hicks, 550 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (promissory
estoppel may be applied where there is a promise to reduce the agreement to writing).
77. See, e.g., Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976). In
Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 238 N.W.2d 290 '(S.D. 1976), the court cited Monarco
with approval, but declined to determine whether promissory estoppel is a separate
basis upon which a promisor may be barred from relying on the Statute. Courts which
reject the application of promissory estoppel do so on the traditional grounds that it
is intended only as a substitute for consideration and that its application abrogates
the Statute. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn.
324, 232 N.W.2d 921 (1975); Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244
N.W.2d 86 (1976); Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976).
78. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973)
provides:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
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the Second Restatement of Contracts provides that a promise
upon which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
reliance on the part of the promisee, and which does induce
reliance, is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute if injustice
can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. At first
glance it appears that section 217A merely reaffirms those deci-
sions which applied the Monarco rule or section 90 of the First
Restatement of Contracts." However, section 217A appears
to be more cautious in its approach. The section sets forth a
number of factors which are to be considered in determining
whether injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the
promise. One of these factors, for instance, is the availability
of other remedies, such as restitution. This limitation was not
contained in previous statements of promissory estoppel"0 and
it therefore suggests that the Second Restatement has at-
tempted to establish a compromise position between the forms
of estoppel developed under prior law.
To date section 217A has had only limited application.81
Therefore, the full effect which this section might have on con-
tracts within the scope of section 2-201 is still unknown. It is
clear, however, that courts may choose between several forms
of estoppel including that expressed in section 217A to bar
reliance upon section 2-201. This choice is complicated by the
fact that application of any one of the forms of estoppel is based
upon sound commercial reasons. It could be argued, for in-
stance, that only equitable estoppel should be used to supple-
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancel-
lation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance
in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence
of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are
otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor.
79. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra. One comment to § 217A observes
that the "Section is complementary to § 90, which dispenses with the requirement of
consideration if the same conditions are met . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcrs § 217A, Comment a (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973). Another comment states
that "the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement
of writing." Id. Comment b.
80. See note 61 supra.
81. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 59 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970).
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ment section 2-201 since it keeps at a minimum the number of
oral contracts which are enforced in the absence of statutory
compliance. On the other hand, promissory estoppel including
section 217A of the Second Restatement reflects the growing
recognition that reliance provides a substantive basis for relief
even though formal contract requirements are not satisfied.2
One might think that despite judicial disagreement on the
precise form of estoppel to be applied in concrete fact situa-
tions that courts would concur on the extent of the reliance or
the nature of the injury necessary to compel relief. Surprisingly
enough this consensus is lacking in cases arising under section
2-201. Several courts, for example, have suggested that reliance
on an oral contract in making resale contracts with third par-
ties requires relief81 in the form of enforcing the oral contract
despite its noncompliance with section 2-201. Other courts
have refused to find that such reliance and hardship are suffi-
cient to avoid the effects of section 2-201. Whether or not this
conflict will extend to other fact situations that arise under
section 2-201 is unknown. There are not sufficient cases to date
on which such a determination could be based. Unfortunately,
pre-Code cases contain similar conflicts5 and are therefore of
limited value in predicting results under the Code.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the question of what form of estoppel
should be applied to defeat reliance on the Statute of Frauds
has existed for years. This controversy lives on under section
2-201 of the Code. Today, there are at least four different forms
of estoppel from which a court may choose. In the absence of a
legislative amendment resolving the debate, a complete and
authoritative solution appears doubtful. Section 1-103, while
referring to estoppel, does not offer any indication of which
alternative form the doctrine should take. Section 2-201 and its
accompanying comments are silent as well. This silence has
given the courts the opportunity to weigh the merits of each of
82. See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
83. See, e.g., Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D.
1976); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86
(1976).
85. Compare Mosekian v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118, 40 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1964) with Goldstein v. McNeil, 122 Cal. App. 2d 608, 265 P.2d 113 (1954).
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the different views but has also resulted in an unpredictable
and inconsistent application of the law.
A basic objective of the Uniform Commercial Code is to
provide a uniform set of principles to govern transactions in the
sales of goods.8 The cases indicate, however, that this objective
will not be achieved until such time as the legislature addresses
specifically the issue of estoppel and section 2-201. In view of
the controversy and the fact that there are sound reasons to
support application of any one of the doctrine's forms, a legisla-
tive solution is imperative.
86. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102 & 2-103(4).
